

Discussion of:

# Currency Matters: Analyzing International Bond Portfolios

by Burger, Warnock, and Warnock

Brent Neiman

University of Chicago

IFM Fall Meeting 2017

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**Problem: No-bilat, often no currency, no domestic**

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Problem: Insufficient currency info, no domestic
- Source: BIS issuance data  
Problem: Insufficient currency info post-'11, can't see who buys LCU debt

# Burger, Warnock, and Warnock: Currency Matters!

They show this in two ways:

## 1. Indirect Approach

- Compare bilateral holdings (from CPIS) with share of total issuance in the currency of the investor:

$$x_{ij} = \phi_i + \phi_j + \beta \left( \frac{i\text{'s issuance in } j\text{'s currency}}{i\text{'s total issuance}} \right) + \epsilon_{ij}$$

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- $\beta > 0$  implies that a country's portfolio is skewed toward countries that issue in that country's currency

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## 2. Direct Approach (US only)

- Home-bias measure comparing U.S. bilateral holdings with issuance data from that country:

$$\Theta_{i,USA} = \frac{i\text{'s bonds share in US portfolio}}{i\text{'s bonds share of world portfolio}}$$

- If  $\Theta_{i,USA} < 1$ , “bias” away from  $i$ 's assets. If  $\Theta \approx 1$ , no bias..
- Well known that  $\Theta_{i,USA} < 1$ .
- What's new?: Calculate  $\Theta_{i,USA}^{LCU}$  and  $\Theta_{i,USA}^{USD}$

# Burger, Warnock, and Warnock: Currency Matters!

They show this in two ways:

## 2. Direct Approach (US only)

- Home-bias measure comparing U.S. bilateral holdings with issuance data from that country, currency-by-currency:


$$\Theta_{i,USA}^{LCU} = \frac{i\text{'s LCU bonds share in US portfolio}}{i\text{'s LCU bonds share of world portfolio}}$$

vs.

$$\Theta_{i,USA}^{USD} = \frac{i\text{'s USD bonds share in US portfolio}}{i\text{'s USD bonds share of world portfolio}}$$


# Burger, Warnock, and Warnock: Currency Matters!

$$\Theta_{i,USA}^{LCU} = \frac{i\text{'s LCU bonds share in US portfolio}}{i\text{'s LCU bonds share of world portfolio}}$$




# Burger, Warnock, and Warnock: Currency Matters!

$$\Theta_{i,USA}^{LCU} = \frac{i\text{'s LCU bonds share in US portfolio}}{i\text{'s LCU bonds share of world portfolio}}$$



$$\Theta_{i,USA}^{USD} = \frac{i\text{'s USD bonds share in US portfolio}}{i\text{'s USD bonds share of world portfolio}}$$



# Burger, Warnock, and Warnock: Currency Matters!

- Authors deserve great credit for suggesting prominence of previously understudied issue. A very substantial contribution.
- So, what does currency matter for? The authors focus on:
  - Home Bias. If it's home currency bias, argues against many stories from voluminous literature (e.g. information, law, etc.)
  - Inference about roles of trade and FX vol. Omitted variable bias implies variation in USD shares impact our estimates.
  - Drivers of time-series variation in flows. USD and non-USD flows respond differently to shocks.



# Some Key Limitations (Acknowledged by Authors)

- Example 1 (Corporate Debt):
  - Commodity firms work in USD and price their debt in USD.
  - Americans like foreign investment in commodity firms.
  - Implies Chile has more USD-debt and US investment
- Example 2 (Government Debt):
  - Argentina needs to issue under NY law, easiest done in USD
  - Americans value the protections of US law bonds.
  - Implies Argentina has more USD-debt and US investment
- Non-US analyses are only suggestive. Is US is special?
- Implications beyond better understanding of portfolio shares?


# Maggiore, Neiman, and Schreger (2017)

- We assemble novel security-level data on \$27 trillion in global mutual fund holdings domiciled in dozens of countries
- CUSIP-level, so can separate by currency, maturity, coupon rate, industry, jurisdiction. Can even separate by firm!:


$$s = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Currency Dummy} + \omega_{\text{firm}} + \phi \cdot \text{Controls} + \epsilon$$

	CAN	CHE	EMU	GBR	SWE	USA
Currency	0.922*** (0.010)	0.660*** (0.011)	0.580*** (0.008)	0.529*** (0.015)	0.803*** (0.014)	0.611*** (0.008)
Obs.	34,457	34,457	34,457	34,457	34,457	34,457
R <sup>2</sup>	0.952	0.934	0.824	0.830	0.954	0.851
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes



# Skewed Allocation of Foreign Capital to Domestic Firms







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
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
# Portfolio Differences, Firms with only LC Debt



←  
Overweight in  
Domestic Portfolio

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


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# Conclusion

- Use standard public data to suggest critical importance of factor that's been under our noses all along!
- Effect not well identified, but neither was original home bias, and led to voluminous empirical and theoretical literature
- Results suggest big payoff for us all to turn attention to currency – MNS (2017) isolates role of currency in micro data, explores implications for capital allocation within countries
- Great Paper!